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LET US NOT BE INTIMIDATED: PAST AND PRESENT
APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 11(B) OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT
Carly E. Zipper*
Abstract: As John Lewis said, “[the] vote is precious. Almost sacred. It is the most powerful
non-violent tool we have to create a more perfect union.” The Voting Rights Act (VRA),
likewise, is a powerful tool. This Comment seeks to empower voters and embolden their
advocates to better use that tool with an improved understanding of its little-known protection
against voter intimidation, section 11(b).
Although the term “voter intimidation” may connote armed confrontations at polling
places, some forms of intimidation are much more subtle and insidious—dissuading voters
from heading to the polls on election day rather than confronting them outright when they
arrive. For example, thousands of Black and Brown voters were targeted in 2020 with
misleading robocalls stating that the government used vote-by-mail records to track down old
warrants, that credit card companies used vote-by-mail records to collect outstanding debts,
and that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) used vote-by-mail records to track people for
mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations.
This Comment argues that section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act has been underutilized
since it was enacted in 1965. Section 11(b), which was intended to protect Black voters from
racialized intimidation, provides a civil cause of action against state or private actors who
“intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.” There are few
published decisions interpreting section 11(b), and executive enforcement of this provision is
insufficient.
Because voters of color are typical targets of intimidating conduct, a more robust
enforcement of section 11(b) is essential to promoting equitable access to civic participation.
This Comment therefore begins with an exploration of racialized voter intimidation in the
United States. It goes on to investigate why section 11(b) is underdeveloped, and finally, it
proposes that litigants should be aware of special considerations if they choose to bring
section 11(b) actions.

INTRODUCTION
[The] vote is precious. Almost sacred. It is the most powerful nonviolent tool we have to create a more perfect union.1
–Congressman John Lewis

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. Many thanks to Professor
Lisa Manheim for her suggestions, advice, and guidance on this Comment. I would also like to thank
Washington Law Review’s Editorial Staff for their thoughtful edits, hard work, and dedication.
1. PBS NewsHour, Georgia Rep. John Lewis: ‘Your Vote Is Precious, Almost Sacred’, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 6, 2012), https://youtu.be/uWuhPU6GkZM [https://perma.cc/TY4G-KDKD].
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Mail-in voting sounds great, but did you know that if you vote by
mail, your personal information will be part of a public database
that will be used by police departments to track down old warrants
and be used by credit card companies to collect outstanding
debts? The CDC is even pushing to use records for mail-in voting
to track people for mandatory vaccines.2
–Robocall to thousands of voters in Illinois, Ohio, New York, and
Pennsylvania
As John Lewis said, the vote is a precious, powerful tool. The Voting
Rights Act (VRA),3 likewise, is a powerful tool. This Comment seeks to
empower voters and their advocates to better use that tool with an
improved understanding of its little-known protection against voter
intimidation, section 11(b).4 In response to insidious voter intimidation,
this important but underutilized provision should be applied with renewed
vigor.
Although the term “voter intimidation” may connote armed
confrontations at polling places, some forms of intimidation are much
more insidious—dissuading voters from heading to the polls on election
day rather than confronting them outright when they arrive.5 That was
certainly the case when Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman sent intimidating
robocalls to thousands of Black and Brown voters, suggesting that voting
by mail would expose them to the risk of financial and bodily harm.6
Because voters of color are the typical targets of intimidation, a more
robust enforcement of section 11(b) is essential to promote equitable
access to civic participation. Section 11(b), which was intended to protect
Black voters from racialized intimidation, provides a civil cause of action
against state or private actors who “intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
person for voting or attempting to vote.”7 Section 11(b), unlike other
federal voter intimidation statutes, does not require proving the
defendant’s intent or conspiracy to intimidate—making it more plaintiff-

2. Nat’l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 52 U.S.C.).
4. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
5. Shaila Dewan, Armed Observers, Chants of ‘4 More Years’ at Polls: Is That Legal?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/poll-watching-intimidation.html?smid=
url-share [https://perma.cc/BU6T-2UQK] (“‘It’s always much more smoke than fire,’ said Tova
Wang, an elections expert and visiting fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. ‘I worry that it’s more
about deterring people and scaring people from the polls than it is about a real plan.’”).
6. See Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
7. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
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friendly than other voter intimidation laws.8 Even so, there are few circuit
court opinions that interpret section 11(b), and the federal government has
brought minimal enforcement litigation under this section.9 Section 11(b)
of the VRA is underutilized, and this allows various forms of voter
intimidation to proliferate.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a summary of
voting rights in the United States. This Part focuses on historic
suppression of Black Americans’ voting rights and the powerful civil
rights movement that produced the VRA. Then, it details the ratification
and early history of the VRA. Finally, Part I concludes by examining the
landmark 2013 decision Shelby County v. Holder,10 which eviscerated
sections 4 and 5 of the VRA and empowered states to pass increasingly
restrictive voting laws.11 After Shelby County, the remaining VRA
provisions, including section 11(b), are more important than ever.
Part II explores the use of section 11(b) in federal courts and its
enforcement by the United States Department of Justice. This Part
investigates how case law interpreting section 11(b) is underdeveloped.
Part II also shows that the Department of Justice has brought only minimal
enforcement litigation under section 11(b), and, paradoxically, the
defendants in those cases were almost always Black.
Part III suggests three reasons why section 11(b) is underutilized. First,
modern voter intimidation is difficult to pin down: in cases involving
online disinformation and misinformation, it is difficult to identify
defendants and track the effects of their conduct. Second, there are
insufficient incentives for litigants to bring these claims given the short
timeline between the events in question and the election they seek to
influence. Third, litigants bringing section 11(b) claims will likely face
constitutional challenges involving unresolved First Amendment
questions. Plaintiffs should be aware of these three obstacles at the outset
of litigation.
Part IV argues that plaintiffs bringing section 11(b) claims should be
prepared for interpretive questions related to the intent behind the
defendants’ intimidating or threatening conduct, even though 11(b) does
not expressly contain an intent requirement. Part IV emphasizes the role
of advocates in framing the courts’ understanding of this underdeveloped
cause of action. It urges that lawyers thoughtfully frame the relevant
issues and facts to reach their clients’ goals while also advocating for
8. Ben Cady & Tom Glazer, Voters Strike Back: Litigating Against Modern Voter Intimidation, 39
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 204 (2015).
9. See infra Part II.
10. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
11. Id. at 557; see infra Part I.
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greater voting rights protections.
I.

TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE HISTORY
OF RACIALIZED VOTER INTIMIDATION IN THE UNITED
STATES

Because voter intimidation in the United States is starkly racialized,12
this Part begins by examining the historic suppression of Black
Americans’ voting rights. Section I.A examines why the
Fifteenth Amendment did not do enough to protect Black Americans’
right to vote, how Jim Crow laws codified voter intimidation and
suppression for nearly a century, and how the powerful civil rights
movement produced the VRA in 1965. Section I.B describes the VRA’s
legislative history, structure, and its first twenty-odd years of existence.
Section I.C examines recent changes in VRA jurisprudence after the
landmark Shelby County decision of 2013, which drastically shifted the
landscape for voting rights in the United States and increased the
importance of protecting voters from intimidation and threatening
conduct.
A.

Voting Rights in the United States Before the VRA

Although “[t]here is no right more basic in our democracy than the right
to participate in electing our political leaders,”13 that right was
inaccessible to Black Americans throughout most of American history.
Beginning in 1619 when the first enslaved Africans were kidnapped and
brought to Jamestown, Virginia, Black people in the United States were
excluded from political participation.14 By the time of the Founding, some
free Black men could vote, and thousands more free Black men were later
able to vote during the nineteenth century.15 However, that small period
of progress proved short lived.16
In the years leading up to the Civil War, Black suffrage was
increasingly restricted: most states denied Black people the right to vote,
and even those that did not were free to impose barriers on that right.17 In
12. See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won’t Go Away, 11
TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 359, 360 (2002).
13. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 191 (2014).
14. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 7 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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New York, for example, where Black men could vote, they had to meet
minimum property-ownership qualifications.18 Property qualifications
barred most Black men from voting due to legal and social barriers that
prevented them from buying land.19 Following the Civil War,
disenfranchisement persisted in both the North and the South—as “whites
in [the North] voted against equal suffrage in eight out of eleven
referendums on the issue.”20 It was this political climate that abolitionists
were up against when they fought for the Fifteenth Amendment.
1.

The Fifteenth Amendment Prohibited Denial of the Right to Vote
Based on Race, but Its Practical Effect Was Hindered

The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, stating that “[t]he right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”21 Section 2 of the Amendment vested Congress
with the power to enforce its substantive guarantee “by appropriate
legislation.”22 Congress immediately enacted the Enforcement Act of
1870,23 which created the first enforcement mechanisms for the Fifteenth
Amendment. In the years that followed, Black voter registration and
turnout swelled, and elected office became more diverse—and more
representative—than it had ever been before.24
However, federal courts interpreted the Enforcement Act narrowly. For
example, in United States v. Reese,25 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Enforcement Act was appropriate only to the extent that it
mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment’s protections against abridgement of
voting rights due to race, color, and previous conditions of servitude—
remarking that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Roy W. Copeland, In the Beginning: Origins of African American Real Property
Ownership in the United States, 44 J. BLACK STUD. 646 (2013) (describing how many states
prohibited Black men from owning property outright or required government documentation that most
did not have, such as birth certificates; showing that even without those formal legal barriers, social
barriers such as white refusal to sell land to Black buyers or white violence directed at Black
landowners prevented Black citizens from acquiring property).
20. Davidson, supra note 14, at 8.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
22. Id. § 2.
23. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; see also United States v. Amsden, 6 F. 819,
824 (D. Ind. 1881) (holding section 5 of the 1870 Enforcement Act, which made voter intimidation a
misdemeanor, unconstitutional because it lacked reference to racial discrimination).
24. In 1872, for example, 324 Black men were elected to state and federal legislative positions.
Davidson, supra note 14, at 10.
25. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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suffrage upon any one.”26 The Court thereby allowed states to abridge
voting rights on other grounds, so long as they did not expressly base such
abridgement on the protected classifications outlined in the
Fifteenth Amendment.27 With this decision, the Court paved the way for
the facially neutral, but effectively discriminatory, practices of the Jim
Crow era.
Following Reese, states were empowered to enact thinly veiled
discriminatory voting laws. And in a vicious cycle, as more discriminatory
voting laws were enacted, Congress became less representative, and it
became less likely that further legislation would strengthen the
Enforcement Act’s protections.28 What followed was one of the most
discriminatory periods in American history.
2.

Jim Crow Laws Systematically Disenfranchised Black Voters

The Jim Crow era is commonly defined as the period between the end
of Reconstruction29 in 1877 and the beginning of the civil rights
movement in the 1950s.30 During this period, the southern states
systematically prevented equality for Black Americans in all aspects of
life; one crucial aspect of this racist system was preventing Black people
from participating in democracy.31
Southern disenfranchising conventions32 were a breeding ground for
blatant suppression of the Black vote, particularly by way of literacy tests,
poll taxes, and grandfather clauses.33 Unsurprisingly, early Jim Crow laws

26. Id. at 217.
27. Id. at 217–18.
28. Davidson, supra note 14, at 10–11.
29. Reconstruction is the period of American history after the Civil War, when southern states that
had seceded were re-integrated into the Union. Eric Foner, Reconstruction, ENCYC. BRITANNICA
(Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/event/Reconstruction-United-States-history [https://
perma.cc/PRY9-MUGC].
30. Melvin I. Urofsky, Jim Crow Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Jim-Crow-law [https://perma.cc/32ZT-SV4F]. 1877 is when the
Supreme Court held in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877), that states could not prohibit segregation
by common carriers. Urofsky, supra.
31. Urofsky, supra note 30.
32. Conventions were held in many southern states to devise ways of preventing Black citizens
from voting. See, e.g., 33 CONG. REC. 3223 (1900) (statement of Sen. Benjamin R. Tillman) (“We did
not disfranchise the [n-words] until 1895. Then we had a constitutional convention convened which
took the matter up calmly, deliberately, and avowedly with the purpose of disfranchising as many of
them as we could under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.”).
33. Davidson, supra note 14, at 11–13. Literacy test: requiring voters to pass a test showing a
certain level of literacy before allowing them to vote. Poll tax: requiring voters to pay a tax before
allowing them to vote. Grandfather clause: requiring voters to show that their grandfather had voted
before allowing them to vote.

10 - Zipper_Ready for Publisher (Do Not Delete)

2022]

VOTER INTIMIDATION

3/25/2022 9:37 PM

307

caused a rapid decline in Black voter registration: in 1896, when
Louisiana’s grandfather clause was passed, 44.8% of eligible Black voters
were registered, while only 4% of eligible Black voters were registered in
1900.34 But that decline does not mean Black Americans were not already
fighting to regain the franchise.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) won an early victory in 1915, when the United States Supreme
Court found Oklahoma’s grandfather clause unconstitutional.35 The
NAACP went on to challenge the white primary36 in Texas repeatedly,
and after a protracted series of cases,37 the Supreme Court finally held in
Smith v. Allwright38 that the white primary was unconstitutional under the
Fifteenth Amendment.39 That 1944 case was championed by Thurgood
Marshall, who would later become the first Black Supreme Court
Justice.40
In the two decades that followed Smith, Black Americans fought in the
streets and in court for equal citizenship. Three civil rights acts were
passed: first in 1957,41 then in 1960,42 and again in 1964.43 But while these
acts made strides in other important respects, their voting provisions were
“tentative, piecemeal efforts that failed to breach the barriers maintained
by southern white supremacists.”44
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which outlawed poll taxes, was
adopted in 1964.45 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court decided
Reynolds v. Sims,46 holding that certain forms of vote dilution47 violate the
34. A History of the Voting Rights Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/votingrights-act/history-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/5GGQ-CG43].
35. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364–65 (1915).
36. A white primary is a primary election in which only white voters were allowed to participate.
White Primary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/white%20
primary [https://perma.cc/2AP5-XTPV].
37. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
38. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
39. Id. at 664–66.
40. See, e.g., WIL HAYGOOD, SHOWDOWN: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2015) (detailing Marshall’s nomination and confirmation
to the Supreme Court).
41. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
42. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
44. Davidson, supra note 14, at 13.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
47. Vote dilution, also known as gerrymandering, occurs when states dilute non-white votes by
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and further stated:
“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise [of voting] in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.”48
B.

The Voting Rights Act and Its Early Challenges

The early 1960s saw a groundswell of activism in the Deep South,
culminating in the famous Selma to Montgomery March, which was
described as “the field on which a decisive battle for the vote
[was] . . . fought.”49 The activists chose Selma, Alabama, because of its
“extraordinary” registration requirements50 and because its sheriff “could
be counted on to overreact to peaceful civil rights demonstrations.”51 As
the activists expected, unjustified police violence erupted and press
coverage was massive.52 The violence continued for weeks, and pressure
mounted on President Johnson, who had already announced his intent to
sponsor voting rights legislation in January of 1965.53
On Sunday, March 7, 1965, activists set out to march from Selma to
Montgomery.54 John Lewis, the civil rights leader and future
Congressman who organized the march, recalled that “[m]any of the men
and women gathered [to march] had come straight from church.”55 He
described the atmosphere as “somber and subdued, almost like a funeral
procession.”56 Marchers took a “sacred path” through the streets of Selma
to the Edmund Pettus Bridge, where they were confronted by “a sea of

“drawing district lines that give whites a majority in a disproportionate share of districts, thus ensuring
that minority voters are unable to elect a candidate of their choice.” Heather K. Gerken,
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (2001).
48. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
49. Davidson, supra note 14, at 15. Activism in Selma began as a registration drive in Dallas
County, a county with over 15,000 voting-age Black citizens, but where only 335 Black citizens were
registered to vote in fall of 1964. Id.
50. Id. Dallas County (where Selma is located) allowed voters to register only two days out of each
month, required them to fill in more than fifty pieces of discrete information in a form, hand-write a
part of the U.S. Constitution from dictation, read sections of the Constitution and answer questions
about them, answer questions about the government system, and swear loyalty to the state of Alabama
and the United States.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15–16.
54. JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT
323 (1998).
55. Id. at 325.
56. Id.
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blue-helmeted, blue-uniformed . . . state troopers” and “a crowd of about
a hundred whites, laughing and hollering, waving Confederate flags.”57
Upon realizing that the marchers could go no further without being
attacked, Lewis led the marchers in a prayer.58
Police sprayed demonstrators with tear gas and hit them with clubs,
injuring at least 90 of the 600 marchers.59 Following this display of racist
brutality, Lewis spoke to a crowded church full of “more than six hundred
people, many bandaged from the wounds of that day”—he called for
continued activism and directly challenged President Johnson for
prioritizing foreign engagements over the civil rights of Black Americans
in the United States.60 A week later, President Johnson announced the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 in a stirring speech about Congress’s past
failure with respect to voting rights.61 Black activism and sacrifice led
directly to the passage of the VRA.
1.

Getting the VRA Through Congress

When he presented the VRA to Congress, President Johnson
acknowledged prior voting rights failures and swore that this bill would
accomplish what others failed to.62 The VRA’s protections against voter
intimidation were considered crucial and were a conscious departure from
previous bills.63
In a House Judiciary Committee hearing, United States Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach testified on the lack of an intent
requirement in section 11(b).64 Katzenbach testified that the “most serious
inadequacy” of prior statutes outlawing voter intimidation was “the
practice of some district courts to require the Government to carry a very
onerous burden of proof of ‘purpose.’”65 Katzenbach went on to argue that
57. Id. at 325–26.
58. Id. at 327.
59. Id. at 330; see also Davidson, supra note 14, at 16.
60. LEWIS & D’ORSO, supra note 54, at 330–31.
61. Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise
(March 15, 1965), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-theamerican-promise [https://perma.cc/9ZFD-7LWM] (“The last time a President sent a civil rights bill
to the Congress it contained a provision to protect voting rights in Federal elections. That civil rights
bill was passed after 8 long months of debate. And when that bill came to my desk from the Congress
for my signature, the heart of the voting provision had been eliminated. This time, on this issue, there
must be no delay, no hesitation and no compromise with our purpose.”).
62. See generally id.
63. Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 11–12 (1965) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 12.
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under the new section 11(b), “defendants would be deemed to intend the
natural consequences of their acts.”66 Finally, he emphasized that the lack
of an intent requirement was “a deliberate and . . . constructive departure
from the language and construction of [prior voter intimidation
statutes].”67
Southern white politicians of both parties opposed the VRA, calling the
bill “grossly unjust and vindictive in nature,” “totalitarian,” and
“unconstitutional.”68 Nonetheless, the VRA’s advocates were steadfast,
and the House approved the bill by a vote of 328 to 74.69 The Senate
approved the bill the next day by a vote of 79 to 18.70
2.

Overview of the VRA

The VRA was enacted in 196571 as the United States’ most robust
federal statute protecting voting rights from infringement by government
actors and private actors alike.72 The VRA created a constellation of
provisions relating to election administration (sections 2, 4, and 5) as well
as protections from public and private voter intimidation (section 11(b)).
Together, these provisions sought to ensure that U.S. elections were
accessible to those who had historically been excluded, most pressingly
the Black community.
Historically, sections 4 and 5, which worked together, were the most
impactful sections of the VRA. Section 4 established covered jurisdictions
and banned literacy tests at the polls.73 Covered jurisdictions were those
with the worst histories of racial voter discrimination: Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and forty counties in North Carolina, Alaska, and
Virginia.74 Section 5, in turn, required covered jurisdictions to secure
federal preclearance before enacting certain new voting regulations.75 The

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Davidson, supra note 14, at 18 (first quoting Sen. Herman E. Talmadge, then quoting Sen.
Strom Thurmond, then quoting Rep. Howard W. Smith).
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
72. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (“It is consistent with the broad
purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county government
complies with the § 5 approval requirements.”).
73. § 4, 79 Stat. at 438–39.
74. LAURIE COLLIER HILLSTROM, DEFINING MOMENTS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 96–
97 (Kevin Hillstrom & Cherie D. Abbey eds., 2009).
75. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439; 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
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federal preclearance process required covered jurisdictions to receive a
declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia
stating that a proposed voting law change comported with section 5 before
the jurisdiction could enact the change.76 Preclearance was intended to
ensure that proposed changes had no discriminatory intent or impact
before allowing them to take effect.77
Another potent section of the VRA is section 2. This section originally
mirrored the language of the Fifteenth Amendment and continued with its
broad, sweeping assertion that no state practice “shall be imposed . . . in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race.”78 Section 2 has been
invoked to protect voters from racial gerrymandering in redistricting, and
in the years since Shelby County nullified section 4, section 2 is
increasingly important for challenging racially discriminatory voting
laws.79
Section 11(b) of the VRA is relatively less well known compared to
sections 2, 4, and 5. Section 11(b) provides that “[n]o person, whether
acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting
or attempting to vote.”80 Section 11(b) thus prohibits voter intimidation
by state or private actors. Like other civil rights statutes, the VRA can be
enforced by private citizens under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.81 Plaintiffs bringing
a claim under that statute can recover attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.82
3.

Early Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Responses to the VRA

Almost immediately after the VRA became law, states challenged it in
court. In the 1966 case South Carolina v. Katzenbach,83 South Carolina
challenged the law by suing the United States Attorney General. The
central issue was whether the VRA’s coverage formula and preclearance
76. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
77. See id. § 10304(b)–(d).
78. Id. § 10301(a).
79. See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (reversing
a Ninth Circuit decision that held two Arizona voting laws unconstitutional under section 2 of the
VRA).
80. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
82. Id. § 1988(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of
this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
83. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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provision were constitutional.84 The United States Supreme Court held
that the provision was constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,
reasoning that the Fifteenth Amendment constitutes a broad directive and
a grant of power to Congress to enact “any rational means” it deems
necessary to end voter discrimination.85 The Katzenbach decision
specifically mentioned that Congress could encroach on state sovereignty
and treat states differently with respect to this issue so long as its coverage
formula was “rational in both practice and theory.”86
Meanwhile, the VRA’s impacts on access to voting were borne out
empirically. A 2009 study found that between the 1964 and 1968
presidential elections, Black voter registration rates in the South rose by
67%.87
The VRA’s reach continued to be upheld and extended across the
following two decades, even if not enthusiastically. In 1970, President
Nixon reluctantly signed an extension of the VRA.88 President Nixon
originally opposed extending the VRA and had considerable support in
Congress for his view.89 The Nixon Administration attempted instead to
pass a watered-down version of the VRA by deleting section 5, but when
that bill did not pass the Senate, Nixon was forced to sign a stronger VRA
in 1970 that included a permanent nationwide ban on the use of literacy
tests.90 A few months later, the Supreme Court upheld the new VRA’s
nationwide ban on literacy tests in a five-four decision.91 In 1975,
President Ford signed another extension of the VRA.92 This time,
Congress modified the Act to require all jurisdictions with a non-English
speaking population of 5% or more to provide voting materials and
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. at 324. The Katzenbach Court wrote that VRA was an “uncommon exercise of congressional
power.” Id. at 334.
86. Id. at 330. Justice Black dissented, arguing that the preclearance requirement should have been
struck down due to its encroachment on state sovereignty. Id. at 359–62 (Black, J., dissenting).
87. Desmond Ang, Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of Federal Oversight
Under the Voting Rights Act, 11 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 1 (2019).
88. Davidson, supra note 14, at 29.
89. The North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin introduced several amendments that would have
weakened section 5. Id.
90. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–
2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 686–87, 754 (2008); KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43626,
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 18–19 (2015).
The ban otherwise would have needed periodic reauthorization and only applied to covered
jurisdictions. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.) (banning literacy tests for covered jurisdictions under section 4 of
the 1965 VRA).
91. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
92. HILLSTROM, supra note 74, at 108.
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assistance in other languages.93
Despite opposition from the executive branch,94 Congress resolved to
perpetuate the VRA; under congressional pressure, President Reagan
signed a twenty-five-year extension in 1982.95 The 1982 extension
expressly disallowed vote dilution and did not require plaintiffs to show
the defendant’s discriminatory intent to prevail on this issue.96 The 1982
extension also provided for disability accommodations in voting and
assistance for illiterate voters—a marked reversal from the days of literacy
tests.97 While President Reagan characterized the 1982 extension as
evidence of bipartisan support for voting rights, that extension was mostly
championed by Democratic legislators.98
The VRA was next reauthorized in 2006. The 2006 reauthorization was
signed by President George W. Bush after overcoming Republican
objections in Congress.99 It made private civil actions more tenable by
allowing plaintiffs to recover reasonable expert fees and other litigation
expenses in addition to attorney’s fees.100 The enacting legislature
acknowledged that “[s]ignificant progress” toward equality had been
made since 1965 in such measures as registration, voter turnout, and
representation.101 However, it went on to find that “continued evidence of
racially polarized voting” in covered jurisdictions demonstrated the need
for reauthorization to combat “second generation barriers constructed to
prevent minority voters from fully participating in the electoral
process.”102
Scholars have argued that “the high visibility, traceability, and
accessibility characteristic of the legislative process ultimately played to
93. Id.
94. During his 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan called the VRA “humiliating to the
South” and promised to “restore to state and local governments the power that properly belongs to
them.” RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 29 (1996).
95. HILLSTROM, supra note 74, at 109–10.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See JESSE H. RHODES, BALLOT BLOCKED: THE POLITICAL EROSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT 94–95 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2017).
99. The objections had to do, in part, with the requirement to print ballots in languages other than
English. Carl Hulse, Rebellion Stalls Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/22/washington/22vote.html?searchResultPosition=3
[https://
perma.cc/NJG5-MR9R].
100. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 6, 120 Stat. 577, 581 (codified as amended at
52 U.S.C. § 10310(e)).
101. Id. § 2(b)(1).
102. Id. § 2(b)(1)–(3).
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the advantage of the civil rights movement and its congressional allies”—
while judicial appointments and administrative policy allowed the VRA’s
opponents to roll the Act back in less visible ways.103 This dynamic likely
has influenced the evolution of the VRA in the modern era and paved the
way for modern rollbacks, including the well-known Supreme Court
decision Shelby County v. Holder.104
C.

The Modern Era: Section 11(b) Regains Importance as Sections 4,
5, and 2 Recede

Although Shelby County dealt with sections 4 and 5 of the VRA, it
provides context for why section 11(b) has taken on renewed importance.
There is not necessarily a direct overlap between sections 4, 5, and 2 of
the VRA, which prohibit a complicated set of election-related state
actions, and section 11(b), which prohibits a largely separate set of
intimidating actions taken by either private or public actors. But for a
voter, these challenges are cumulative: dealing with a broad range of
privately and publicly imposed hurdles is more onerous than dealing with
only a narrower subset of problems. Simply put, when Shelby County
effectively ended preclearance, it removed one layer of protection for
voters of color. Without that layer, it is more important to utilize the
protections that still stand.
1.

Shelby County v. Holder: Basics of the Case

The 2013 Supreme Court decision Shelby County v. Holder is notorious
for rejecting a major portion of the VRA.105 Specifically, the Court held
section 4 of the VRA unconstitutional.106 That section, together with
section 5, ensured that certain jurisdictions would be subject to federal
preclearance before altering their voting procedures.107 Such preclearance
requirements were intended to apply to jurisdictions with the worst
histories of racial voter discrimination and were effected through two
103. RHODES, supra note 98, at 95–96.
104. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
105. See, e.g., Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane SCOTUS: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s
Discrimination Checkpoint in Shelby County & the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on Voting Rights,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV., S11, S14 (2015) (arguing that in the Shelby County decision, “the
Supreme Court accorded Congress no deference, ignored controlling precedent, and waved aside the
voluminous record of contemporary voting discrimination that Congress appropriately relied upon
when it reauthorized the VRA in 2006”); Andres A. Gonzalez, Creating a More Perfect Union: How
Congress Can Rebuild the Voting Rights Act, 27 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 74 (2017) (describing
Shelby County as “a blow to the heart of the VRA”).
106. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 557.
107. 52 U.S.C. § 10304.
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separate VRA provisions: section 5 contained the preclearance
requirement, and section 4 contained the coverage formula that
determined which jurisdictions were subject to section 5’s requirement.108
Shelby County, Alabama, alleged that sections 4(b) and 5 were
unconstitutional and requested a permanent injunction109 against their
enforcement.110 The County claimed that Congress’s 2006 reauthorization
exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment,111 thus violating
the Tenth Amendment112 of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves for the
states all powers not specifically granted to the federal government.113 The
County, relying on Katzenbach114 and Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder,115 also argued that the VRA treated states
differently without a “rational” basis to do so.116 It argued that the 2006
reauthorization could not be “rational” because it was based on data from
1964, 1968, and 1972.117 The Supreme Court agreed, overturning the
District of Columbia Circuit.118
To understand the Shelby County decision and the subsequent status of
the VRA, it is important to acknowledge the 2006 reauthorization of the
VRA. With an extensive record before it, the 2006 Congress determined
that “40 years has not been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the
vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 years of disregard for the
dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure that the right of all citizens
to vote is protected as guaranteed by the Constitution.”119 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court rejected the 2006 reauthorization in Shelby County, partly

108. Id.
109. An injunction is “[a] court order commanding or preventing an action.” Injunction, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
110. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 529.
111. “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
112. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
113. Brief for Petitioner at i, Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. 529 (No. 12-96).
114. Supra section I.B.3. Recall under Katzenbach, Congress could encroach on state sovereignty
and treat states differently to remedy voting inequities so long as its reason for treating states
differently was “rational in both practice and theory.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
330 (1966).
115. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
116. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 5.
117. Id. at 5, 10.
118. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. 529.
119. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(7), 120 Stat. 577, 578.
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on the grounds that it was based on insufficient and outdated data.120
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
preclearance requirements departed from basic principles of federalism by
burdening some states more than others.121 This disparate burden, the
Court found, was a violation of the “equal sovereignty” principle as
articulated in Northwest Austin.122 The Court in Northwest Austin wrote
that “a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”123 Roberts
acknowledged that the data from the 1960s was sufficient to support
section 4 when it came before the Court in Katzenbach in 1966124—that
at the time, the coverage formula “made sense.”125 But he was persuaded
that, after so much time had passed, the Act’s disparate treatment was no
longer “sufficiently related to the problem that it target[ed]” when it came
before Congress in 2006, at which time registration rates were basically
equal between Black and white citizens.126 Based on that reasoning, the
Court held that section 4(b)’s coverage formula was facially
unconstitutional—effectively striking down section 5 as well.127
In one of her most memorable dissents, Justice Ginsburg criticized the
majority’s holding in Shelby County, stating that “[t]hrowing out
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm
because you are not getting wet.”128 She argued that the majority
inexplicably expanded the equal sovereignty principle beyond its
120. 570 U.S. at 551 (“Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The
formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the
1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years. And voter
registration and turnout numbers in the covered States have risen dramatically in the years since.”
(internal citations omitted)).
121. Id. at 535.
122. Id. at 544–46 (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009)).
123. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203.
124. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 551 (“Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence
justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There is no longer such a disparity.”
(internal citation omitted)).
125. Id. at 546.
126. Id. at 551.
127. Although the court “issue[d] no holding on § 5 itself,” the result of holding section 4
unconstitutional was that section 5 was rendered inoperable. Id. at 557; see also id. at 559 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“While the Court claims to ‘issue no holding on § 5 itself,’ its own opinion
compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to justify ‘current burdens’ with a record
demonstrating ‘current needs.’ By leaving the inevitable conclusion unstated, the Court needlessly
prolongs the demise of that provision.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
128. Id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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domain,129 and placed an unreasonable and unusual burden on defenders
of legislation.130 Many academics agreed with Justice Ginsburg and
sought alternative ways to protect voters using other provisions of the
VRA; specifically, section 2 became a popular alternative.131
2.

Voter Protections After Shelby County

In the wake of the Shelby County decision, conditions for voters across
the nation changed dramatically. While the preclearance protections of
sections 4 and 5 were not the only protections afforded by the VRA, they
stood out in their proactive, preventative nature. The preclearance
provisions were also especially effective. They “led to gradual and
significant increases in voter participation [that] persisted for over 40
years, bolstering turnout by 4–8 percentage points” since their
inception.132 And without these provisions, the remainder of the VRA has
been the subject of renewed interest for voter advocates and scholars.
Although it became clear at oral argument for Shelby County that
Justice Kennedy believed section 5 was unnecessary for the VRA to
succeed, section 5’s dormancy changed conditions for voters overnight.
Section 5 was unnecessary, in Kennedy’s view, because section 2 allows
discriminatory voting changes to be blocked through preliminary
injunctions.133 But immediately after Shelby County obviated section 5,
many states enacted new laws that previously would have been
unlawful.134 For example, Texas announced a strict voter identification
document (ID) requirement the same day Shelby County was decided.135
129. Ginsburg wrote that the Court inappropriately relied on dicta from Northwest Austin when it
was bound instead by controlling precedent from Katzenbach, which found that the equal sovereignty
principle “applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union.” Id. at 587
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)).
130. Id. at 580–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143 (2015) (noting that the Shelby
County decision struck down section 5 of the VRA and arguing for the use of section 2 actions
instead).
132. Ang, supra note 87, at 3.
133. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. 529 (No. 12-96).
134. Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 24, 2014),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later#_ednref6
[https://perma.cc/
QTU9-8R79]; see also Voter ID Chronology, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-chronology.aspx [https://
perma.cc/ZY8S-89NF] (listing all voter ID laws in effect between 2000 and 2020; showing increase
in states with strict voter ID laws after Shelby County).
135. Ryan J. Reilly, Harsh Texas Voter ID Law “Immediately” Takes Effect After Voting Rights
Act Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/texasvoter-id-law_n_3497724.html [https://perma.cc/Z9WZ-7ZW9].
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Texas also announced it would immediately instate a 2011 redistricting
plan136 that was denied preclearance in 2012 due to evidence that “the plan
was enacted with discriminatory intent.”137 And Texas was not alone:
similar voter ID laws soon followed in Alabama138 and Virginia.139 The
2016 election was the first national election in fifty years without the
protection of sections 4 and 5 of the VRA, and scholars have argued that
voter suppression played a role in the outcome of that election.140
After Shelby County, section 2 of the VRA remains in effect. However,
section 2 is vulnerable because of unsettled questions regarding its
application and constitutionality. In deciding section 2 claims, lower
courts apply a two-part test that “asks if an electoral practice (1) causes a
disparate racial impact (2) through its interaction with social and historical
discrimination.”141 However, there is much disagreement “over basic
questions like whether the test applies to specific policies or systems of
election administration; whether it is violated by all, or only substantial,
disparities; and whether disparities refer to citizens’ compliance with a
requirement or to their turnout at the polls.”142
Moreover, section 2 of the VRA lies on “thin constitutional ice.”143 In
the recent case Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,144 the U.S.
Supreme Court avoided deciding whether section 2 is constitutional, but
nonetheless upended section 2 by creating a list of several new factors for
courts to consider when ruling on these claims.145
Brnovich consolidated challenges to two Arizona policies: first, the
policy of throwing out in-person ballots cast in the wrong precinct, and
second, a statute that criminalized absentee ballot collection by any person
136. Id.
137. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 161 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 570 U.S. 928 (2013).
138. ALA. CODE § 17-9-30 (2018).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (2015).
140. See, e.g., Matthew Murillo, Did Voter Suppression Win President Trump the Election?: The
Decimation of the Voting Rights Act and the Importance of Section 5, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 591, 608–09
(2017) (arguing that the absence of section 5’s preclearance provisions were one reason for Trump’s
narrow victory in Wisconsin and North Carolina in 2016); see also SCOTT SIMPSON, THE LEADERSHIP
CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE GREAT POLL CLOSURE 4 (Jeff Miller ed., 2016),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BC45FG6] (finding empirically that 165 out of the 381 counties studied, or 43%, reduced voting locations
in the 2016 election after Shelby County removed the preclearance requirement from those
jurisdictions).
141. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1566
(2019).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 594 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
145. Id. at 2338.
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other than a postal worker; an election official; or a voter’s caregiver,
family member, or household member.146 The Democratic National
Committee (DNC) challenged the policy and statute under section 2 of the
VRA, alleging they “adversely and disparately affect[ed]” voters of
color.147 The DNC also brought a Fifteenth Amendment challenge,
alleging the ballot-collection statute was “enacted with discriminatory
intent.”148 In upholding Arizona’s policy and statute, the Court resolved a
circuit split between the Ninth Circuit, which held “that anything beyond
a de minimis statistical disparity qualifies as a discriminatory burden”
under section 2, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which
interpreted section 2 such that “‘disproportionate racial impact alone’ is
insufficient; the challenged practice must also abridge ‘the opportunity to
vote.’”149
Arizona argued that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 2
(invalidating laws and policies with disparate racial impacts that were
“more than . . . de minimis”150) was overbroad and “raise[d] serious
constitutional concerns.”151 Those concerns were, first, that invalidating
state voting laws under section 2 based on “insubstantial” disparate racial
impacts would exceed Congress’s powers to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, and second, that fashioning state laws to avoid
“insubstantial” disparate impacts would itself be an Equal Protection
Clause violation because legislators would have to consider race when
drafting the law.152 On that basis, Arizona argued that facially race-neutral
voting regulations should be exempt from section 2, so long as they did
not impose anything more than an “ordinary burden” on voters of color.153
“Disparate participation does not imply disparate opportunity,” Arizona
argued, “and [section] 2 is an equal-opportunity statute, not an equaloutcome mandate.”154 While the Court did not adopt this argument whole
cloth, it remains to be seen whether section 2 will survive future
constitutional challenges.
Although section 2 is the most commonly argued-for alternative to

146. Id. at 2325.
147. Id. at 2334.
148. Id.
149. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (No. 19-1257) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637–38 (6th Cir. 2016)).
150. Brief of State Petitioners at 25, Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (No. 19-1257) (quoting Democratic
Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1054 (9th Cir. 2020)).
151. Brief of State Petitioners, supra note 150, at 24.
152. Id. at 24–27.
153. Brief of Private Petitioners at 19, Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (No. 19-1257) (emphasis omitted).
154. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
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sections 4 and 5, a few scholars also see potential in section 11(b) of the
VRA to offer additional voter protections (albeit of a different kind) after
Shelby County.155 Section 11(b) provides a cause of action for voters to
bring voter intimidation claims against public and private actors. The
statute prohibits actual or attempted “intimidation,” “threats,” and
“coercion” against a person, either “for voting or attempting to vote” or
“for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote.”156
Section 11(b) is not the only federal statute that reaches voter
intimidation by private actors. It was preceded by section 2 of the
Enforcement Act of 1871 (“KKK Act”)157 and section 131(b) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957.158 Because the scope of section 11(b) is largely
untested, its similarities and differences with the other voter intimidation
statutes are illustrative.159 Section 11(b) shares language with
section 131(b) of the Civil Rights Act, but unlike section 131(b),
section 11(b) of the VRA has no intent requirement.160 Section 11(b)
shares language with section 131(b) of the Civil Rights Act, but unlike
section 131(b), section 11(b) of the VRA has no intent requirement.161
Similarly, the KKK Act prohibits “force, intimidation, or threat” with
respect to voting, but while it lacks the intent requirement, it requires a
conspiracy between defendants.162 By contrast, “all a section 11(b) claim
requires is a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and a voting-related
activity and a showing that the defendant’s conduct was objectively
intimidating, threatening, or coercive.”163 Scholars have argued that this
language creates opportunities for litigators to build new precedent

155. See, e.g., Cady & Glazer, supra note 8 (arguing for a renewed focus on bringing section 11(b)
claims following Shelby County); cf. Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Myth of Voter Suppression and the
Enforcement Record of the Obama Administration, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1147, 1171 (2019) (arguing
that “actual voter suppression” is rare if not absent from American elections because the Obama
administration did not bring any enforcement actions under section 11(b)).
156. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“[I]f two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal
manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President
or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person
or property on account of such support or advocacy . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.”).
158. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(b).
159. Cady & Glazer, supra note 8, at 191.
160. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(b).
161. Id. § 10101(b).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
163. Cady & Glazer, supra note 8, at 193.
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through skillful impact litigation.164 But despite well-documented
examples of conduct that a jury could find objectively intimidating,165 and
section 11(b)’s enhanced accessibility for plaintiffs as compared to other
federal voter intimidation statutes, section 11(b) is still used infrequently.
3.

Expiry of Anti-Intimidation Consent Decree

One more recent development makes section 11(b) increasingly
important: the 2017 expiry of a consent decree166 that restricted
Republican poll monitoring for nearly four decades.167 The Republican
National Convention (RNC) entered the federal consent decree after its
New Jersey branch organized aggressive poll watching during a 1981
governor’s race.168 The New Jersey RNC recruited off-duty police officers
to form a “Ballot Security Task Force” that patrolled polling places in
predominantly Black and Brown neighborhoods.169 The officers wore arm
bands and carried firearms and radios, obstructing voters from accessing
the polls.170
The Democratic National Committee (DNC) sued the RNC for these
acts, and the parties settled the case by entering a consent decree in
1982.171 Importantly, the consent decree bound the national RNC, not just
the New Jersey RNC.172 The terms of the consent decree were modified
in 1987 after midwestern regional RNC leadership produced memoranda
indicating clearly nefarious intentions: “this program will eliminate at
least 60,000–80,000 folks from the rolls . . . If it’s a close race . . . which
I’m assuming it is, this could keep the [B]lack vote down considerably.”173
As modified, the consent decree “added a preclearance provision that
prohibit[ed] the RNC from assisting or engaging in ballot security
activities unless the RNC submit[ted] the program to the Court and to the
164. Id. at 191.
165. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
166. “In a consent decree, a court-ordered settlement, the court orders an injunction against the
defendant and continues to oversee the case to ensure the injunction is followed. If the defendant does
not follow the order, other penalties are available to the judge.” TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS
OF VOTER SUPPRESSION: DEFENDING AND EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE 55 (2012).
167. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 18-1215, 2019 WL 117555 (3d
Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).
168. Id. at *1.
169. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 81-03876, 2016 WL 6584915, at
*2 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2016).
170. Id.
171. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 2019 WL 117555, at *1.
172. Id.
173. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580 (D.N.J.
2009), aff’d, 673 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2012).
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DNC with 20 days’ notice and the Court determine[d] that the program
complie[d] with the Consent Decree and applicable law.”174 Like the
VRA’s former preclearance requirement, the consent decree required the
RNC to justify ballot security initiatives and efforts before undertaking
them.
Originally, the consent decree had no expiration date, but the District
Court of New Jersey imposed an expiration date in 2009.175 After the 2009
order, the consent decree was set to expire on December 1, 2017, unless
the DNC showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the RNC had
violated its terms.176 Such a violation would extend the consent decree by
eight years.177 The DNC, seeking to extend the decree, moved to hold the
RNC in contempt shortly before the 2016 presidential election.178 After
issuing eight orders limiting discovery on that motion, the district court
found that the DNC had not met its burden to extend the decree, and
ordered that the consent decree expired.179 This order was affirmed on
appeal.180
It is significant that the 2020 election was the first nationwide election
in forty years without preclearance for the RNC’s “ballot security”
measures. The consent decree’s preclearance mechanism may have
prevented many actionable examples of voter intimidation while it
remained in effect. The expiration of the consent decree therefore helps to
illustrate the increasing importance of section 11(b) claims, particularly
when coupled with Shelby County’s functional elimination of the VRA’s
preclearance requirement, which applied directly to governmental actors.
II.

SECTION 11(B) ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS

Since the Voting Rights Act took effect in 1965, there have been
relatively few published decisions interpreting section 11(b).181 Shortly
after the statute’s enactment, civil rights defendants used section 11(b) to
remove their cases to federal court after being prosecuted for voter
registration efforts.182 This resulted in a few circuit court decisions on civil

174. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 198.
175. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 18-1215, 2019 WL 117555, at *1
(3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See infra Part II.
182. Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 521 (5th Cir. 1968).
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rights removal between 1965 and 1972 that either directly applied
section 11(b) or compared other statutes to it when ruling on the removal
issue.183 It was not until 2014 that another circuit court considered an
11(b) issue—but even then, the issue was not thoroughly discussed by the
Second Circuit.184 Moreover, the Department of Justice brings minimal
enforcement litigation under section 11(b)—and that litigation has
disproportionately pursued Black defendants.185
A.

Section 11(b) Is Underdeveloped at the Circuit Court Level

Research has uncovered six circuit court opinions interpreting
section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act, with only one opinion being
published so far in the twenty-first century.186 The Fifth Circuit published
three of these cases—not surprising, given that until 1981, that Circuit
heard cases arising from district courts in nearly the entire Deep South.187
After the VRA was enacted in 1965, the first circuit court to discuss its
11(b) provision was the Fifth Circuit in 1968.188
That 1968 case was Whatley v. City of Vidalia,189 where the
Fifth Circuit held that Black citizens who were prosecuted for
encouraging others to register to vote were entitled to remove their claims
to federal court by citing section 11(b) of the VRA.190 This case shows
how the VRA provided enhanced access to federal courts. Criminal
defendants removing their cases to federal court on civil rights grounds
must allege that they were “denied or cannot enforce” their federal civil
rights in state court.191 Under Supreme Court precedent, the removal
statute was interpreted to require “that the very act of prosecuting them
for the protected activity would violate an express prohibition of the
federal statute.”192 By creating a cause of action for voter intimidation that
183. Infra section II.A.
184. Dekom v. Nassau Cnty., 595 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order).
185. Id.
186. Whatley, 399 F.2d 521; New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1969); New York v.
Horelick, 424 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1970); Dekom, 595 F. App’x 12; Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7
(5th Cir. 1972); Dodson v. Graham, 462 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
187. Before the Eleventh Circuit was created in 1981, the Fifth Circuit included Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Brief History, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIR.,
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/about-the-court/circuit-history/brief-history [https://perma.cc/9K2PAMA7].
188. Whatley, 399 F.2d 512.
189. 399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1968).
190. Id. at 521–22, 526.
191. Id. at 523 (citing Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)); see also City of Greenwood
v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
192. Whatley, 399 F.2d at 525–26.
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encompasses public and private acts directed at both voting and aiding
others to vote or register to vote, the VRA’s section 11(b) created the
necessary “express prohibition”193 that allowed the Whatley defendant to
obtain a federal trial.
After Whatley, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation was questioned by the
Second Circuit. The Second Circuit disagreed with the reasoning in
Whatley, finding that section 11(b) was implicitly addressed in the
Supreme Court case City of Greenwood v. Peacock194 and that 11(b) could
not be a basis for civil rights removal.195 “However, that Court
subsequently conceded that ‘citation in a footnote would be a rather
elliptical way to decide such an important question’ and left it open.”196
In 1972, the Fifth Circuit went on to decide Dodson v. Graham.197 In
that case, plaintiffs challenged election results under section 5 of the
VRA, and as an alternative, under section 11(b).198 The District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia at Atlanta dismissed the complaint, and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, discussing section 5 thoroughly but only briefly
mentioning section 11(b).199
Finally, after a forty-two-year dry spell, another 11(b) action made its
way into a published circuit court opinion in 2014. In Dekom v. Nassau
County,200 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim.201 The plaintiff, who was
seeking admission to a local Republican Convention as a proxy for
another voting member, was allegedly yelled at by one of the
defendants.202 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal
because the plaintiff did not have an independent right to vote in the

193. Id. at 523, 526.
194. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
195. New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750, 754 n.3 (2d Cir. 1969) (“While we do not disagree with
the recent decision in [Whatley], we cannot accept the view of the majority opinion that the Peacock
court did not take account of § 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was enacted subsequent
to initiation of the state prosecutions there sought to be removed. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, referred to § 11(b) . . . , and Mr. Justice Douglas made it a principal basis for the dissent.”
(internal citations omitted)).
196. Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 36–37, 37 n.66 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting New York v.
Horelick, 424 F.2d 697, 702–03, 703 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970)).
197. 462 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
198. Id. at 148.
199. Id. (“We agree with the District Court that the record is bereft of anything that could possibly
be construed to constitute intimidation, threats, or coercion (or an attempt at such) within the meaning
of § 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . .”)
200. 595 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2014).
201. Dekom, 595 F. App’x at 13 (summary order).
202. Id. at 14–15.
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primary, and he was permitted entry when he produced the proxy.203
While these circuit court decisions are important examples of how legal
ambiguity can result in barriers to access to justice, they tell us little about
how a plaintiff can succeed on the merits of a section 11(b) claim.
The one circuit court decision that does interpret section 11(b)
conflated the statute with other, prior civil rights statutes that had intent
requirements.204 In Olagues v. Russoniello,205 the Ninth Circuit read a
specific intent requirement into 11(b), despite the lack of any such
requirement in the statute.206 This interpretation was given fewer than 100
words of explanation in the opinion.207 In granting plaintiffs’ motion to
dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reached back to a Fifth Circuit decision208 that
interpreted the 1957 Civil Rights Act, not the VRA, despite the fact that
the plaintiffs brought claims under both statutes.
B.

Public Enforcement of Section 11(b) Has Been Minimal

While history has overwhelmingly shown that Black voters are more
often the targets of intimidation, research suggests that the only two
government enforcement actions under section 11(b) have alleged
intimidation by Black defendants against white voters.209 These two cases,
brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) during George W. Bush’s
second term as President, highlight both the inadequate enforcement of
this provision in the communities most affected by intimidation and the
courts’ unwillingness to engage in thorough analyses of section 11(b)
claims.
In United States v. Brown,210 the United States alleged, and the
Mississippi District Court found, “the proof establishes a specific racial

203. Id.
204. Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1522 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Apparently, the appellants
contend that the Government also violated [section 11(b) of the VRA and section 131(b) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957]. Under these sections no person may intimidate, or attempt to intimidate any
person from voting or from aiding someone to vote. In the instant case, there is evidence that the
investigation did intimidate the appellants. However, that is insufficient. The appellants failed to raise
a material issue of fact as to whether the government officials did in fact intend to intimidate them.”
(emphasis in original) (citing United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 740–41 (5th Cir. 1967))),
vacated, 484 U.S. 806 (1987).
205. 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 (1987).
206. Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1522.
207. Id.
208. McLeod, 385 F.2d at 740–41.
209. Cases Raising Claims Under Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-section-11b-voting-rightsact#philadelphia [https://perma.cc/2WHD-VMNP].
210. 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007), aff’d, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009).
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intent by [B]lack election officials to disenfranchise white voters” under
section 2 of the VRA.211 Alongside that finding, the Court dismissed the
Government’s contention “that [the defendant’s] public ‘threat’ to
challenge . . . white voters if they attempted to vote . . . violates
[s]ection 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”212 Without explaining
its reasoning or citing any supporting precedent, the district court stated
in a footnote that it “does not view the publication [of a list of white voters
to be challenged] as the kind of threat or intimidation that was envisioned
or covered by [s]ection 11(b).”213
Then, in 2009, the United States filed a complaint against the New
Black Panther Party and some of its leaders in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.214 That complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief
under section 11(b) of the VRA and alleged that defendants “wore
military style uniforms” on election day in 2008 and brandished “a
nightstick, or baton” outside a polling place, “approximately eight to
fifteen feet from the entrance.”215 The government also alleged that
defendants “made statements containing racial threats and racial insults”
and “made menacing and intimidating gestures, statements, and
movements directed at individuals who were present to aid voters.”216
The United States later voluntarily dismissed its complaint against all
defendants except Minister King Samir Shabazz.217 With respect to
Shabazz, the Government moved for,218 and was granted, default
judgment after Shabazz failed to respond or appear.219 The Government
requested the court enjoin Shabazz from “displaying a weapon within 100
feet of any open polling location on any election day in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, or from otherwise engaging in coercing, threatening, or
intimidating behavior in violation of [s]ection 11(b).”220

211. Id. at 486.
212. Id. at 477 n.56.
213. Id.
214. Complaint, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 09-cv-00065
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2009).
215. Id. at 2–3.
216. Id. at 3.
217. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, New Black Panther Party, No. 09-cv-00065. Minister Shabazz
allegedly brandished a weapon and attempted to block physical access to a polling place. Complaint,
supra note 214, at 2–3.
218. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Default Judgment at 1, New Black Panther
Party, No. 09-cv-00065.
219. New Black Panther Party, No. 09-cv-00065 (order granting default judgment); see also Jud.
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 800 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing the procedural
history of New Black Panther Party in the context of a Freedom of Information Act ruling).
220. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, supra note 218, at 5.
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The Government’s briefing in support of its motion for default
judgment against Shabazz analyzed the requirements of 11(b) perhaps
more thoroughly than any other government-produced litigation
document on this cause of action. First, the Government distinguished
section 11(b) from the Civil Rights Act of 1957, emphasizing
section 11(b)’s lack of a specific intent requirement.221 Then, it noted that
“[t]he few district court opinions pertaining to [s]ection 11(b) have not
provided much guidance as to what constitutes a violation.”222 To argue
that Shabazz’s actions constituted a violation, the Government suggested
that the terms “intimidate, threaten, or coerce” should be given their plain
meaning and that the Fifth Circuit interpreted the same words, in the 1957
Civil Rights Act, in a manner that would encompass Shabazz’s actions.223
Though the court entered default judgment in the claim against
Shabazz, that does not mean it attributed any weight to the Government’s
argument on the merits. Hence, neither section 11(b) claim brought by the
DOJ provides much guidance as to what constitutes a successful claim on
the merits. Also, it is clear from the two enforcement actions that the DOJ
disproportionately asserted claims on behalf of white voters against Black
individuals and groups. This enforcement philosophy is poorly aligned
with the needs of communities of color and, by extension, the needs of the
American democratic experiment.
III. THREE REASONS WHY SECTION 11(B) IS
UNDERUTILIZED
Understanding why section 11(b) is underutilized and underdeveloped
requires looking beyond the doctrine to realities on the ground. This
analysis may, in turn, inform future litigants considering claims under this
provision. To that end, this Comment identifies three potential reasons for
the deficiency.
First, modern forms of voter intimidation are hard to pin down, with
difficult-to-identify, loosely-affiliated perpetrators and diffuse effects.
Second, these claims face an all-too-common obstacle for election-related
litigation: plaintiffs lack sufficient incentives to bring these claims given
the often-tight window between intimidating conduct and the election that
conduct is intended to affect. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
plaintiffs face significant constitutional issues that are unknown and
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 10; see also id. at 10 n.4 (“The extant cases perhaps provide better guidance as to what
does not constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion under Section 11(b), though even in that regard
there is little consistency in the case law.” (emphasis in original)).
223. Id. at 10–11 (citing United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 739–41 (5th Cir. 1967)).
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difficult to predict. Namely, the Supreme Court has not defined the exact
scope of the true threats exception to the First Amendment in two
significant ways: whether true threats must threaten physical harm, and
whether true threats must be intended as threats by the speaker.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to provide a thorough analysis
of these questions. Instead, the goal of this Part is to identify obstacles that
litigants should be aware of when they bring 11(b) claims.
A.

Modern Voter Intimidation Is Increasingly Diffuse

The early twenty-first century, which has been dominated in many
ways by social media, has created new, unregulated forums for
disinformation, misinformation, and intimidation.224 This modern era is
characterized by increasing polarization and partisan hostility,225 as well
as reckless or malicious falsehoods regarding election administration and
security that threaten elections’ fairness.226 This has led to voter
intimidation that is “amorphous and largely subjective in nature, and
lacks . . . concrete evidence.”227
The same online atmosphere that created the modern era of polarization
also created openings for individuals to anonymously express generalized
threats that could suppress turnout even without regard to whether they
are actually carried out. In 2016, for example, some voters professed on
4chan and Facebook that they would resort to violence if their preferred
candidate was not elected.228 It is unknown whether such violent discourse
suppressed turnout—as in any election, countless factors converge to
influence each individual vote. To determine whether generalized, nontargeted threats had an influence is a tall order, and not one that would
224. Ravi Somaiya, How Facebook Is Changing the Way Its Users Consume Journalism, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/business/media/how-facebook-ischanging-the-way-its-users-consume-journalism.html?smid=url-share
[https://perma.cc/VHP8B6KZ]; Mike Isaac, Facebook Finds New Disinformation Campaigns and Braces for 2020 Torrent,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/technology/facebookdisinformation-russia-iran.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/3P9Z-Z3JN].
225. Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[https://perma.cc/DYL5-QWZU]; Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, CrossCountry Trends in Affective Polarization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26669,
2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26669 [https://perma.cc/56RT-589Q].
226. See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343 (2010) (detailing voter
deception as a form of voter intimidation).
227. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 50 (Richard C. Pilger ed.,
8th ed. 2017).
228. See Jessica Reaves, Election Day: Some Decry “Rigging,” “Intimidation,” and Threaten
Violence, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.adl.org/blog/election-day-somedecry-rigging-intimidation-and-threaten-violence [https://perma.cc/4A9J-CN3E].
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necessarily entitle a particular plaintiff to relief against a particular
defendant.
These generalized threats, especially when shared widely on social
media alongside real violence, can easily create a hostile environment and
stoke worries about threats, harassment, and aggressive poll watching.
When President Trump said, “go into the polls and watch very carefully,”
he accomplished something, regardless of whether any polling place
intimidation actually occurred—Trump’s words implied that Biden voters
would find intimidation at their polling place on election day.229
Dissuading voters from showing up is perhaps the whole point of these
statements. Further, the credibility of this violent rhetoric was reinforced
in 2021 when Trump’s supporters stormed the Capitol in an attempt to
stop the certification of his successor.230
The effect of this conduct, again, is diffuse, but it has the potential to
be far-reaching. The broader an intimidation campaign becomes, the
harder it is to litigate. Litigation requires identifying at least one particular
defendant as well as a particular harm done to the plaintiff.231 But if an
intimidation campaign is waged online, it is much harder to identify
particular plaintiffs affected by the conduct and particular defendants to
hold accountable. And even where it is possible to identify the parties
involved, litigation cannot go back and undo the affected election
outcome, so some perpetrators may choose to risk litigation to promote
their desired outcome. The next Part will explore that phenomenon.
B.

There Are Insufficient Incentives for Plaintiffs to Bring
Section 11(b) Claims

Like many civil rights statutes, the success of the VRA depends in large
part on individuals bringing actions for injunctive relief when their rights
have been violated.232 However, given the cyclical and nearly-irreversible
nature of elections, plaintiffs have insufficient incentives to bring suit
under section 11(b) of the VRA.

229. Danny Hakim, Stephanie Saul, Nick Corasaniti & Michael Wines, Trump Renews Fears of
Voter Intimidation as G.O.P. Poll Watchers Mobilize, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/trump-election-poll-watchers.html [https://perma.cc/C8W
P-ZF2K].
230. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Sabrina Tavernise & Emily Cochrane, As House Was Breached, a Fear
‘We’d Have to Fight’ to Get Out, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/01/06/us/politics/capitol-breach-trump-protests.html?action=click&module=Related
Links&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/9AQ9-XHSS].
231. Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
232. 52 U.S.C. § 10308; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (creating private cause of action “under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote”).
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For example, Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman orchestrated a robocall
campaign in advance of the 2020 election for which they are now facing
criminal charges and civil lawsuits, including a suit for section 11(b)
claims.233 The conservative operatives sent misleading robocalls to 85,000
people, mostly in communities of color, suggesting that the government
would use voter registration information to enforce a mandatory
coronavirus vaccine.234 The National Coalition on Black Civic
Participation sued Burkman and Wohl for voter intimidation under
section 11(b).235 In granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order, Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New
York ordered Wohl and Burkman to call back all their original targets and
inform them that the earlier call was untrue.236 Luckily, Judge Marrero’s
ruling in National Coalition on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl237 came
down before election day. However, it is easy to imagine such a remedy
being unavailable or ineffective, especially when litigation happens after
election day.
For obvious reasons, it is difficult for plaintiffs to obtain legal recourse
that applies to the same election they were prevented from voting in by
way of intimidation. Rather, private enforcement relies on plaintiffs
bringing claims after the fact seeking declaratory judgments, injunctions,
or small awards of money damages. The deterrence value of these actions
may be enough to motivate some plaintiffs, but not all.
While one might expect that the federal government would pursue
litigation to enforce section 11(b), federal enforcement has been largely
absent, save for a short period where the DOJ brought actions against
Black defendants for harassment of white voters. It is beyond the scope of
this Comment to determine why the DOJ has avoided section 11(b)
233. Nat’l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d 457, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
234. Id. at 465; see also Stephanie Saul, Deceptive Robocalls Try to Frighten Detroit Residents
About Voting by Mail., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/
us/elections/deceptive-robocalls-try-to-frighten-detroit-residents-about-voting-by-mail.html?search
ResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/5NWA-9MMT]; Kathleen Gray, Two Conservative Operatives
Charged in a Robocall Scam Are Ordered to Call 85,000 People Back, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/29/us/elections/two-conservative-operatives-charged-in-arobocall-scam-are-ordered-to-call-85000-people-back.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.
cc/7HUG-7SFN].
235. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 463.
236. Id. at 489–90 (“In order to mitigate the damage Defendants have caused and thus endeavor to
return the robocall recipients to the position they were in before Defendants placed those calls, the
Court considers it necessary for Defendants to issue a message to all recipients of the robocalls
informing them about this Court’s finding that Defendants’ original message contained false
statements that have had the effect of intimidating voters, and thus interfering with the upcoming
presidential election, in violation of federal voting-rights laws.”).
237. 498 F. Supp. 3d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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enforcement, but the same challenges that face private plaintiffs could
similarly exert pressure on the government. However, the modern era
shows that voter intimidation is not a thing of the past, and creative
lawyers both in public and private practice must hold bad actors
accountable and deter future intimidation.
C.

Unresolved Constitutional Questions Await Plaintiffs Bringing
11(b) Claims

Constitutional questions remain unresolved with respect to voter
intimidation. It may be that these constitutional questions remain
unanswered, at least in part, due to the consent decree binding the RNC
until 2018. The consent decree likely prevented some of the most
egregious forms of voter intimidation before they took place, thereby
contributing to the dearth of case law on 11(b) claims. But particularly
after the expiration of the consent decree, litigants should prepare for
constitutional arguments to come to a head in the near future.238
Activists for both parties rely on First Amendment protections to
advocate for their political interests.239 In the words of the United States
Supreme Court, statutes such as the VRA “must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must
be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”240
However, the First Amendment’s protections of speech are not
absolute.241
This section discusses the true threats exception as it relates to
section 11(b), with a particular emphasis on open constitutional questions.
The uncertainty surrounding Section 11(b) may contribute to its
underdevelopment despite an increased prevalence of intimidating
conduct.
1.

Whether True Threats Must Be Threats of Physical Harm

Scholars have argued that the lack of an intent requirement in 11(b)
means its protection from intimidation would “almost surely be deemed a

238. See Cady & Glazer, supra note 8, at 209.
239. Interestingly, it has been argued that voter intimidation statutes “protect expressive interests
that the First Amendment protects but do so by granting speech rights that the First Amendment does
not grant and by imposing speech-facilitating duties that the First Amendment does not require.”
Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2299,
2308 (2021).
240. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
241. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 3:1 (2012), Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2012).
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content-based regulation of speech, hence subject to strict scrutiny unless
it falls within some categorical exception.”242 The most obvious exception
worth considering is the true threats exception, which allows the
government to regulate threatening speech without running afoul of the
First Amendment.243 True threats are “those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”244
The true threats exception would clearly allow the government to
regulate any threats of physical violence intended to intimidate voters.245
However, as noted above, modern voter intimidation is increasingly
diffuse, with non-violent harms being threatened and misleading
information246 being used to dissuade voters from registering or voting.247
The true threats exception does not cover hyperbole,248 but it has been
held to cover generalized intimidation “where a speaker directs a threat to
a . . . group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm or death.”249 In the seminal true threats case, Virginia v.
Black,250 the court found cross-burning to be a true threat because it was
credibly associated with racist violence against Black and Jewish
communities.251 Black is important because it shows that threats need not
be individualized nor directly communicated. However, it is unclear
whether a threat that does not evoke fear of violence, death, or bodily harm
would be considered a true threat.252
Overall, even though this area is unresolved, “there is good reason to
believe that many if not all applications of [section 11(b)] would be
consistent with the First Amendment.”253 In the district court ruling in
National Coalition on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, Judge Marrero
rejected the defendants’ argument that their robocalls were protected by

242. Daniel P. Tokaji, True Threats: Voter Intimidation and the Constitution, 40 HARBINGER 101,
105 (2015).
243. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (suggesting in dicta that a speaker’s
intent to intimidate is relevant to whether speech is a true threat).
244. Id. at 359 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
245. Tokaji, supra note 242, at 102.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715 (2012) (holding that falsity does not
exempt speech from First Amendment protections).
247. See supra notes 229–230 and accompanying text.
248. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
249. Black, 538 U.S. at 344.
250. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
251. Id. at 354–56.
252. Tokaji, supra note 242, at 107–08.
253. Id. at 109.
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the First Amendment.254 Marrero described the defendants’
First Amendment theory as “a fundamental threat to democracy” and
wrote that “[t]he First Amendment cannot confer on anyone a license to
inflict purposeful harm on democratic society or offer refuge for
wrongdoers seeking to undermine bedrock constitutional principles. Nor
can it serve as a weapon they wield to bring about our democracy’s selfdestruction.”255
Judge Marrero analyzed the First Amendment issue by first
determining that section 11(b) was a content-based speech restriction.256
He went on to apply the Second Circuit’s objective test and emphasized
that “the Second Circuit has indicated that threats of serious nonphysical
harm are true threats unprotected by the First Amendment.”257 While the
robocall at issue in that case did not indicate that voters would be
physically harmed, it did imply that consequences of mail-in voting would
include warrant execution, debt collection, and mandatory vaccination.258
Judge Marrero relied259 on the Supreme Court’s stated policy for
prohibiting true threats: that the exception “protects individuals from the
fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”260 He reasoned that
“[t]he threat of severe nonbodily harm can engender as much fear and
disruption as the threat of violence” and cited binding Second Circuit
authority interpreting the true threats exception to require a threat of
“injury” (as opposed to violence).261 National Coalition on Black Civic
Participation v. Wohl illustrates the questions plaintiffs must be prepared
to field when bringing voter intimidation claims under section 11(b) and
provides an example of some arguments that have successfully overcome
First Amendment defenses.
2.

Whether True Threats Must Be Intended by the Speaker as Threats

In addition to the open question about whether threats of non-physical
harm can constitute true threats, it is also unclear whether only statements
intended as threats by the speaker can constitute true threats. Whether true
threats must be intended as such has not been resolved by the Supreme

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Nat’l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 479–80.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 479–80.
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Court and has prompted significant scholarship.262 Depending on the
answer to this question, it is possible that the true threats exception would
require proving intent for any 11(b) claim to be successful—functionally
removing one aspect of 11(b) that sets it apart from its sister statutes and
conferring an additional burden on plaintiffs bringing 11(b) claims.
Intent to intimidate was one pillar of the Virginia v. Black decision.
There, the Court emphasized that true threats “encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.”263 However, as Judge Marrero noted
in Wohl, the word “encompass” leaves open the possibility that true
threats include more than what is described in Black.264
Moreover, Black was a criminal case, and section 11(b) imposes only
civil liability, so even if Black requires intent to threaten, that holding may
not extend to section 11(b) claims.265 Judge Marrero noted, without
resolving the intent question, that “even if the Constitution requires a
showing of subjective intent in criminal cases, that requirement may not
apply in civil cases.”266 This interpretation relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision, Elonis v. United States,267 where the Court read an
implicit scienter requirement into a criminal statute’s definition of
“threat” based on the “general rule” that criminal statutes should be
interpreted “to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even
where the statute by its terms does not contain them.”268 Such a rule of
construction does not, to this author’s knowledge, extend to civil statutes.
As a result, it is reasonable to think there may be some daylight between
the true threats exception as applied to civil versus criminal speech
restrictions.

262. See, e.g., Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1226, 1269 (2006) (pointing out uncertainty as to whether a true threat requires a specific mens rea,
and arguing that specific intent to threaten should be required); Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of
Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 333–34 (2001) (arguing for a specific
intent requirement for true threats exception to apply).
263. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969)).
264. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 479.
265. Tokaji, supra note 242, at 108–09.
266. Wohl, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 480.
267. 575 U.S. 723 (2015).
268. Id. at 734 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994)).
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: LITIGANTS SHOULD CONSIDER
INTENTIONALITY AND PHYSICALITY WHEN BRINGING
SECTION 11(B) CLAIMS
Unfortunately, while section 11(b) “is to be given an expansive
meaning,”269 that meaning remains untested. This poses a challenge for
counsel representing targets of voter intimidation—especially when
litigating misinformation, disinformation, and non-physical threats. But
by understanding section 11(b)’s nuance and history, today’s movement
lawyers can successfully influence the construction of this increasingly
important provision.
For example, confusion about the differences between section 11(b)
and the other voter intimidation actions may result in a specific intent
requirement being read back into the statute—even though the legislative
history clearly shows intent should not be required. Recall that the
Ninth Circuit conflated section 11(b) with other, prior civil rights statutes,
which had an intent requirement.270 Litigators must therefore think
strategically about how to characterize defendants’ conduct and the goals
of their clients, because an overzealous reliance on proving defendants’
intent could backfire and preemptively insert the intent requirement back
into the statute despite Congress’s apparent intention not to include it.
Counsel should likewise prepare statutory interpretation arguments to
support their positions on issues prone to confusion or bad law. Of course,
legislative history weighs strongly against an intent requirement.271 But
advocates must also carefully craft arguments pointing to the plain
meaning of words like “intimidate” that foreclose an interpretation that
would require specific intent. While the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of “intimidation” does not include an intent requirement,272
defendants may argue that intimidation connotes intentionality in its
ordinary meaning. By anticipating this argument, advocates can promote
their clients’ goals while pushing for clarity and justice as the courts
consider many of these questions for the first time.
Section 11(b) litigants should also carefully consider the physicality
and intentionality of the threats at issue as they prepare for constitutional
arguments. Given the dearth of case law and the recent changes to the
Supreme Court’s composition, it is likely that the First Amendment
269. Jackson v. Riddell, 476 F. Supp. 849, 859 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
270. See supra section II.A. This problematic interpretation was based on a Fifth Circuit decision
that interpreted the 1957 Civil Rights Act, not the VRA. Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804
(9th Cir. 1985).
271. See supra section I.B.1.
272. Intimidation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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question will be an important one for plaintiffs moving forward. While
the Wohl decision, of course, is not binding, advocates should examine
Judge Marrero’s handling of the First Amendment questions in that case.
Judge Marrero’s reasoning illustrates that section 11(b) advocates have a
strong argument for applying the true threats exception even for nonphysical threats without proving a defendant’s intent to threaten.
Finally, careful communication with clients is key. Given the lack of
sufficient incentives,273 section 11(b) plaintiffs may not have much to gain
personally from litigation. Therefore, plaintiffs who are the victims of
voter intimidation are likely pursuing litigation not only for themselves,
but with a broader goal in mind. Without damages or personal redress as
a motivator, it is imperative to prepare clients for a lengthy and difficult
litigation process and inform them about the obstacles identified in this
piece. Clients deserve a thorough explanation of the broader landscape
their case fits into, with the understanding that courts are considering
many of these questions for the first time. This is especially true for
plaintiffs motivated by personal ideals of justice, democracy, and
altruism.
CONCLUSION
The Voting Rights Act is a powerful tool that should be used to protect
the democratic process. By exploring section 11(b)’s past, present, and
future applications, this Comment seeks to empower voters and their
advocates to push the boundaries on what this provision means to the
VRA, and to insist on elections free of intimidation.
When litigating voter intimidation that has more in common with Jacob
Wohl’s misleading robocalls274 than the archetypal armed confrontation,
advocates should consider bringing section 11(b) claims. But plaintiffs
bringing these claims face significant obstacles: modern voter
intimidation is increasingly diffuse, election cycles create insufficient
incentives, and unresolved statutory and constitutional questions will need
to be litigated. For this reason, advocates must anticipate and attempt to
preemptively dissuade courts from making legal determinations that will
negatively affect their present clients while promoting positive
developments in the jurisprudence of voter protection. This is especially
true in an area as politically charged and polarizing as this one.
Misinformation, disinformation, and non-physical threats can prevent
voters from accessing the polls just as effectively as physical threats. Even
so, we saw on January 6, 2021, that voting-related physical violence is not
273. See supra section III.B.
274. Id.
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a thing of the past. Voters have every reason to take intimidation, threats,
and coercion seriously in the modern era—so seriously that they may
avoid going to the polls altogether. This is why it is imperative that
advocates work diligently to pursue justice on behalf of voters
experiencing intimidation, and why section 11(b) is a powerful tool
moving forward.
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